Associated Builders and Contra v. City of Jersey City by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-12-2016 
Associated Builders and Contra v. City of Jersey City 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Associated Builders and Contra v. City of Jersey City" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 885. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/885 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
        
 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 15-3166 
_______________ 
 
ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONCTRATORS INC 
NEW JERSEY CHAPTER; GMP CONTRACTING LLC; 
ALPINE PAINTING & SANDBLASTING 
CONTRACTORS; ALPER ENTERPRISES INC;  
RON VASILIK 
  Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY;  
HUDSON COUNTY BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION 
TRADES COUNCIL (Intervenor in District Court) 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 2-14-cv-05445) 
Honorable Susan D. Wigenton, District Judge 
_______________ 
 
Argued: June 8, 2016 
 
 2 
 
Before: CHAGARES, KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit 
Judges 
  
(Opinion Filed: September 12, 2016) 
 
Russell J. McEwan, Esq. (Argued)  
Ivan R. Novich, Esq. 
Littler Mendelson 
1085 Raymond Boulevard 
One Newark Center, 8th Floor 
Newark, NJ 07102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants 
 
Zahire D. Estrella, Esq. (Argued) 
Jersey City Law Department 
280 Grove Street 
City Hall 
Jersey City, NJ 07302 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
 
Raymond G. Heineman, Esq. (Argued) 
Seth Ptasiewicz, Esq. 
Kroll Heineman 
99 Wood Avenue South 
Metro Corporate Campus I, Suite 307 
Iselin, NJ 08830 
Attorney for Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
 3 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 In an effort to stimulate economic development, Jersey 
City, New Jersey offers tax exemptions and abatements to 
private developers of projects in certain designated areas.  
Under a law passed by the City, however, those tax benefits 
are conditioned on the developers’ entry into agreements with 
labor unions that bind the developers to specified labor 
practices.  Appellants in this case, various employers and a 
trade group, sought to challenge that law on the grounds that 
it is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) and Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”) and barred by the dormant Commerce Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.  The District Court dismissed 
Appellants’ complaint, concluding that Jersey City acts as a 
market participant, not a regulator, when it enforces the law, 
and therefore that Appellants’ NLRA, ERISA, and dormant 
Commerce Clause claims were not cognizable.  Because we 
conclude that Jersey City was acting as a regulator in this 
context, we will reverse and remand for those claims to be 
reinstated. 
I. 
A. 
 New Jersey’s Long Term Tax Exemption Law and 
Five-Year Exemption and Abatement Law authorize local 
governments in the State to provide tax exemptions and 
abatements to private developers of projects within areas the 
locality has marked for redevelopment.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
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§§ 40A:20-1 to -22; 40A:21-1 to -21.1  The exemptions on 
such Tax Abated Projects significantly reduce developers’ 
property tax burden, although developers may still be 
required to make payments in lieu of property taxes.  See Id. 
§ 40A:21-10.   
 With this authorization, Jersey City offers tax 
exemptions to private developers on certain redevelopment 
projects.  However, Section 304 of Jersey City’s Municipal 
Code (the “Ordinance”) imposes certain requirements on 
developers of “Public Construction Project[s],” which are 
projects costing at least $5,000,000 (excluding land 
acquisition costs) and “entered into by the City using public 
funds,” and “Tax Abated Project[s],” which are projects 
costing at least $25,000,000 (excluding land acquisition costs) 
and funded only with private investment.2  Jersey City, N.J., 
                                              
 1 Under the relevant New Jersey law, abatements and 
exemptions are flip sides of the same coin.  An “abatement” 
is “that portion of the assessed value of a property as it 
existed prior to construction, improvement or conversion of a 
building or structure thereon, which is exempted from 
taxation pursuant to” the Five-Year Exemption and 
Abatement Law, while an “exemption” is “that portion of the 
assessor’s full and true value of any improvement, conversion 
alteration, or construction not regarded as increasing the 
taxable value of a property pursuant to” that law.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 40A:21-3(a), (l).  For ease of reference, we will use 
the term “exemption” in this opinion other than in proper 
names and quoted material. 
 
 2 Neither the City nor intervenor Hudson County 
Building and Construction Trades Council disputes that Tax 
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Mun. Code § 304-33(8) to -33(9) (“Mun. Code”); see 
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. City of Jersey 
City, 2:14-cv-05445, 2015 WL 4640600, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Aug. 
3, 2015); Compl. ¶ 9; Appellants’ Br. at 34.   
 Specifically, the Ordinance requires that, prior to 
commencing work on construction projects exceeding these 
thresholds, developers of such projects must execute project 
labor agreements (“PLAs”), unless the City’s Business 
Administrator determines that a PLA is not appropriate in 
light of the “nature, size, and complexity of the project.”  
Mun. Code § 304-33(7), 34(1).  PLAs require developers of 
Tax Abated Projects to abide by a pre-hire collective 
bargaining agreement that will cover all employees for the 
                                                                                                     
Abated Projects governed by the Ordinance are projects 
funded only with private investment.  At the same time they 
have offered no explanation of how the City can require 
contractors to enter into a project labor agreement (“PLA”) 
with respect to anything other than projects that use public 
funds when the authorizing statute provides only that “[a] 
public entity may include a [PLA] in a public works project 
on a project-by-project basis.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:38-3; see 
Tormee Constr., Inc. v. Mercer Cty. Improvement Auth., 669 
A.2d 1369, 1372 (N.J. 1995) (holding, prior to the enactment 
of § 52:38-3, that a government entity did not have the 
authority to require contractors to enter into PLAs that would 
require the use of one of two unions on “routine [public] 
construction projects”); George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. 
Tpk. Auth., 644 A.2d 76, 94 (N.J. 1994) (holding that a 
government entity could not require contractors to enter into 
PLAs requiring the use of a particular union in the absence of 
express legislative authority). 
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duration of the Tax Abated Project and that also will bind the 
developer’s contractors and subcontractors.  Id. § 304-33(7), 
-33(9), -34(1), -35(3).  Because a PLA, by definition, is 
entered into with a labor union, it requires that an employer 
negotiate with a labor union and that all employees be 
represented by that labor union as part of the negotiations—
even if the developers, contractors, and subcontractors do not 
ordinarily employ unionized labor and the employees are not 
union members.  See Compl. ¶¶ 16, 31.  The PLAs required 
by the Ordinance also specify that “there will be no strikes, 
lock-outs, or other similar actions” and that the developer and 
union will agree to procedures to resolve any labor disputes.  
Mun. Code § 304-35(1) to -35(2).  Under the Ordinance, with 
limited exceptions, each contractor and subcontractor 
working on a Tax Abated Project must have “a local federally 
registered apprenticeship program,” and twenty percent of all 
labor hours must be performed by apprentices who are City 
residents.  Id. § 304-35(4) to -35(5). 
 Having accepted the obligations of a PLA, a developer 
who fails to fulfill them does so at its peril.  Among other 
significant consequences it can impose, the City may 
“[s]uspend the tax abatement” until the developer complies 
with the PLA, during which time the City can assess three 
times the amount of conventional real estate taxes.  And if the 
developer fails to cure within six months, the City may 
terminate the exemption.  Id. § 304-37(2).  The City may also 
collect liquidated damages that include, among other things, a 
payment of two percent of the annual payment in lieu of taxes 
for each month a developer, contractor, or subcontractor is in 
material breach.  Id.  Further, if a developer estimates that the 
cost of a project that received a tax exemption will be less 
than $25,000,000 such that a PLA is not required, but the 
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total cost meets or exceeds that threshold upon completion, 
then the developer must pay significantly increased payments 
in lieu of taxes.  Id. § 304-37(3). 
B. 
 Appellant Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., 
New Jersey Chapter (“ABC-NJ”) is a non-profit organization 
that “advocat[es] for open competition in the award of 
construction contracts based on merit, and regardless of the 
bidding contractor’s labor affiliation.”  Compl. ¶ 2.  
Appellants GMP Contracting LLC, Alpine Painting & 
Sandblasting Contractors, and Alper Enterprises, Inc., are 
New Jersey businesses and members of ABC-NJ, and 
Appellant Ron Vasilik is an employee of Alpine.3  Together, 
these Appellants allege that they and other members of ABC-
NJ have been “deterred” from bidding on projects covered by 
the Ordinance for various reasons, including because they 
have no established relationships with any union and have 
never worked under PLAs; they would have to hire 
employees through a union hiring hall and not in accordance 
                                              
 3 GMP, Alpine, Alper, and Vasilik have standing to 
challenge the Ordinance based on their own alleged injuries.  
See Nat’l Assoc. for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction 
Practice v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216, 218 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015).  
ABC-NJ, on the other hand, has associational standing to 
challenge the Ordinance because some of its members 
allegedly were injured and therefore would otherwise have 
standing to sue; the interests ABC-NJ seeks to protect are 
germane to its purpose; and the claims asserted and the relief 
sought do not require the participation of ABC-NJ’s 
individual members.  See Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., 
LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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with their own standards; they would be restricted to hiring 
only subcontractors that also comply with PLAs; and they 
would have to force their employees to comply with an 
agreement negotiated by a union regardless of their 
employees’ desires.  Compl. ¶ 31. 
 Appellants sued to enjoin enforcement of the 
Ordinance in August 2014, bringing five counts.  Count I 
alleges that the Ordinance is preempted by sections 7 and 8 of 
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158.  Count II alleges that the 
Ordinance violates the dormant Commerce Clause and 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
because the Jersey City apprenticeship requirement unduly 
favors in-state individuals and denies out-of-state individuals 
access to the privileges and immunities of in-state 
apprentices.  Count III alleges that the apprenticeship 
requirement is also preempted by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a).  Count IV alleges violations of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New Jersey 
constitutions.  Finally, based on the alleged constitutional 
violations, Count V asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 In the District Court, the Hudson County Building and 
Construction Trades Council (“Council”) filed a motion to 
intervene, which was granted.  The Council, joined by the 
City, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing 
among other things, that the NLRA, dormant Commerce 
Clause, and ERISA do not apply because the City imposes 
and enforces the PLA requirement in its capacity as a market 
participant, not a regulator.4  The Council also argued that 
                                              
 4 The City joined in the motion to dismiss, but because 
the City had already filed an answer, the City’s motion was 
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none of Appellants had standing to bring a Privileges and 
Immunities Clause claim because none of them are from 
outside New Jersey.  Appellants opposed the motion and also 
sought to file an amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 15(a) that would have clarified some of the 
allegations and added an out-of-state plaintiff in an effort to 
cure the alleged standing deficiency. 
 The District Court determined that the City enforces 
the Ordinance as a market participant, thus rendering the 
NLRA, ERISA, and Commerce Clause claims not cognizable.  
See Associated Builders, 2015 WL 4640600, at *5-7.  Having 
rejected the remaining claims, the District Court granted the 
12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions in full and denied ABC-NJ’s Rule 
15(a) motion for leave to amend.  On appeal, however, 
Appellants challenge only the District Court’s ruling on the 
NLRA, ERISA, and dormant Commerce Clause claims, see 
Oral Arg. Tr. at 16 (argued June 8, 2016), thus presenting 
only the question of whether the City is properly deemed as a 
market participant, in which case Appellants’ claims under 
the NLRA, ERISA, and dormant Commerce Clause are not 
viable, or whether the City instead enforces the Ordinance in 
its capacity as a regulator, in which case the Ordinance might 
be preempted under the NLRA or ERISA or forbidden by the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
                                                                                                     
treated as one for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 
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II.5 
 We review dismissals for failure to state a claim and 
grants of motions for judgment on the pleadings de novo, 
taking all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  
See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 
2010) (setting forth the standard of review for motions to 
dismiss); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(equating the standard of review for motions to dismiss and 
motions for judgment on the pleadings).   
III. 
 The NLRA, ERISA, and the dormant Commerce 
Clause generate distinct doctrines, but by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause, these statutes and this constitutional 
provision will supersede state or local law in certain 
circumstances.  The NLRA preempts any state or local law 
that regulates conduct falling within sections 7 or 8 of the 
NLRA—sections that safeguard an employee’s right to join, 
or refrain from joining, a labor union, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and 
that render it an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
“support” a labor organization through “financial” or other 
means or to “refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees,” id. § 158(a)(2), (5).  See 
generally San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, 
Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).  In addition, 
recognizing that Congress prescribed a certain balance of 
                                              
5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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bargaining power between employers and employees, the 
Supreme Court has held that the NLRA preempts state and 
local laws that strip employers or employees of certain “self-
help” economic tools like strikes and lockouts.  See Lodge 76, 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t 
Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 148-51 (1976).  ERISA 
preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to 
any employee benefit plan”—that is, a plan providing health 
insurance, disability benefits apprenticeships, a pension, or 
other benefits.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1003(a), 1144(a).  
And the dormant Commerce Clause precludes states from 
enacting “regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state 
economic interests by burdening out of state competitors.”  
Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting 
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 
(1988)). 
 Despite their differences, the NLRA and the dormant 
Commerce Clause—and, we will assume, for today’s 
purpose, ERISA6—share the same threshold requirement 
                                              
 6 The parties assume that the market participant 
exception applies in the ERISA context.  Other Circuits have 
applied the exception in this context, see Johnson v. Rancho 
Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 
2010); Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of 
Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 695 (5th Cir. 1999), but we have yet 
to do so.  We need not decide today whether the market 
participant exception limits ERISA preemption, for as we 
explain, the City does not act as a market participant in 
offering tax abatements.  See Keystone Chapter, Associated 
Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 955 n.15 
(3d Cir. 1994) (declining to decide the “novel” question of 
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before their constraints are triggered: that the allegedly 
unlawful act by the state or local government be regulatory in 
nature.  If a state or local government is acting as a market 
participant pursuant to a proprietary interest, it is not so 
constrained by these federal laws or by the relevant 
preemption doctrines.  See generally White v. Mass. Council 
of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (Commerce 
Clause); Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. 
v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc. (Bos. 
Harbor), 507 U.S. 218 (1993) (NLRA); Tri-M Grp., LLC v. 
Sharp, 638 F.3d 407, 421 & n.23 (3d Cir. 2011) (Commerce 
Clause); Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 819 v. Byrne, 568 
F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (NLRA).   
 The market participant exception to these doctrines is 
rooted in the principle that a government, just like any other 
party participating in an economic market, is free to engage in 
the efficient procurement and sale of goods and services.  See 
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 70 
(2008); see also Bos. Harbor, 507 U.S. at 228-30; Reeves, 
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-40 (1980).  Thus, when a 
government “acts as a ‘market participant with no interest in 
setting policy,’ as opposed to a ‘regulator,’ it does not offend” 
federal law.  Brown, 554 U.S. at 70 (quoting Bos. Harbor, 
507 U.S. at 229). 
 Our Circuit has developed a two-part test for 
determining whether a state or locality acts as a market 
                                                                                                     
whether the market participant exception applies to ERISA 
preemption because the state was not acting as a market 
participant in any event). 
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participant.7  First, we ask whether “the challenged funding 
condition”—here, the Ordinance—“serve[s] to advance or 
preserve the state’s proprietary interest in a project or 
transaction, as an investor, owner, or financier.”  Hotel Emps. 
& Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390 
F.3d 206, 216 (Sage) (3d Cir. 2004).  Second, we ask whether 
“the scope of the funding condition [is] ‘specifically tailored’ 
to the proprietary interest,” or, put another way, whether the 
action is so broad as to be considered, in effect, regulatory.  
Id. (quoting Bos. Harbor, 507 U.S. at 232); see also Wis. 
Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 
U.S. 282, 291 (1986).  Only if both conditions are met is a 
government acting as a market participant.  Sage, 390 F.3d at 
216.8 
                                              
 7 Under our precedent, the jurisprudence defining 
market participation in the NLRA and Commerce Clause 
contexts is identical.  See, e.g., Tri-M Grp., 638 F.3d at 421 
(borrowing market participant concepts from the NLRA 
context to inform the inquiry in a Commerce Clause case).  
While we have not opined on the question and need not do so 
today, see supra note 6, other Circuits have concluded that 
the same jurisprudence defines “market participation” in the 
ERISA context as well, even if their tests differ from ours.  
See, e.g., Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1023; Cardinal Towing, 180 
F.3d at 695. 
 
 8 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has held that a 
governmental action need not be either proprietary or 
regulatory and that the NLRA forbids only actions that are 
regulatory; in other words, even if a government is not acting 
as a proprietor, the action might fall outside of the ambit of 
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 We resolve this case at the first step of the Sage test, 
for we conclude that the City lacks a proprietary interest in 
Tax Abated Projects.  The Supreme Court has recognized a 
government’s proprietary interest in a project when it “owns 
and manages property” subject to the project or it hires, pays, 
and directs contractors to complete the project, see Bos. 
Harbor, 507 U.S. at 221, 227; when it provides funding for 
the project, see, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council 
of Camden Cty. v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221 (1984); 
White, 460 U.S. at 214-15; Sage, 390 F.3d at 216-17; or when 
it purchases or sells goods or services, see Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 
592-93 (1997).  But this case fits none of these categories.  
Instead, Appellees argue, and the District Court agreed, that 
the City has a proprietary interest in enforcing the Ordinance 
because “the tax abatement functions as a subsidy that 
finances or invests in each project.”  Associated Builders, 
2015 WL 4640600, at *5.   
                                                                                                     
the NLRA (and, presumably, that of ERISA and the dormant 
Commerce Clause).  See N. Ill. Chapter of Associated 
Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Lavin, 431 F.3d 1004 (7th 
Cir. 2005).  Taking yet a different tack, the Ninth Circuit 
holds that a government acts as a market participant when it 
acts with a proprietary interest or when its act is not narrowly 
tailored—that is, that it meets either prong of our Sage test.  
See Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1024.  These cases have no bearing 
on our analysis, for we are bound by our own precedent in 
Sage, which provides that a government can act either in a 
regulatory capacity or as a market participant and that it acts 
as a market participant only when its actions are specifically 
tailored to a proprietary interest.  390 F.3d at 216. 
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 Appellees’ argument, however, has been rejected 
outright by the Supreme Court.  In Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Supreme 
Court confronted the question of whether the dormant 
Commerce Clause was violated by a Maine statute that 
provided “general exemption from real estate and personal 
property taxes for ‘benevolent and charitable institutions 
incorporated’ in the State,” but provided a more limited or no 
tax benefit to charities that principally benefitted residents of 
other states.  Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 568 (quoting Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 652(1)(A)(1) (Supp. 1996)).  The 
Court held that Maine was not acting as a market participant 
when it gave tax breaks to charities, rejecting the argument 
that the tax exemption “should be viewed as . . . a 
governmental ‘purchase’ of charitable services” that gave the 
State a proprietary interest in charities receiving the 
exemption.  Id. at 588-89.  Although the Court observed that 
a tax exemption may have “the purpose and effect of 
subsidizing a particular industry,” it concluded that an 
exemption is not the “purchase” or “sale” of goods and 
services, but is instead the “assessment and computation of 
taxes—a primeval government activity.”  Id. at 593 (quoting 
New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277).  Therefore, the Court held, 
“[a] tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement 
in the market that falls within the market-participation 
doctrine.”  Id. 
 Although, oddly, cited by the parties in the District 
Court proceedings but not by the District Court itself, Camps 
Newfound resolves this case.  Just as Maine did not purchase 
services from the relevant charities or sell those services 
itself, Jersey City here does not purchase or otherwise fund 
the services of private developers or contractors who are 
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constructing Tax Abated Projects9 or the goods used in those 
projects; nor does it sell those services or goods or invest, 
own, or finance the projects.  See supra note 2.  Instead, the 
City simply reduces the developers’ tax burden for a period of 
time—an endeavor Camps Newfound makes crystal clear is 
not “direct state involvement in the market,” 520 U.S. at 593, 
but rather the “assessment and computation of taxes—a 
primeval government activity,” id. (quoting New Energy Co., 
486 U.S. at 277).  The exemptions thus do not give the City a 
proprietary interest in Tax Abated Projects, and we need not 
reach step two of the Sage test to conclude that the City is not 
acting as a market participant when it enforces the Ordinance. 
 In reaching a contrary conclusion, this District Court 
relied on Regan v. Taxation With Representation of 
Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).   Regan, however, dealt 
with a different issue entirely: whether it was a violation of 
the First Amendment for Congress to deny lobbying 
organizations tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).  
In concluding that it was not, the Supreme Court described 
tax exemptions as “a form of subsidy” with “much the same 
effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax 
it would have to pay on its income,” Regan, 461 U.S. at 544, 
                                              
 9 Appellants challenge the legality of PLAs as they 
relate to Tax Abated Projects, not Public Construction 
Projects.  Therefore, we do not decide whether the City is 
acting as a market participant with respect to the latter set of 
projects.  Cf. Mich. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. 
Snyder, 729 F.3d 572, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
the state acted as a market participant when it passed a law 
that forbade “governmental units from entering into PLAs” 
and that had no effect on private projects). 
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but it nowhere suggested that a government somehow obtains 
a proprietary interest in a project that receives an exemption 
or that its holding had any bearing on the government’s status 
as a market participant for purposes of the NLRA, ERISA, or 
the dormant Commerce Clause.  And if there were any 
ambiguity on that score, it was surely extinguished by Camps 
Newfound fourteen years later, which squarely addressed 
whether a tax exemption is functionally equivalent to direct 
funding for purposes of the market participant exception and 
held that it was not.  Indeed, in holding that a tax exemption 
does not confer upon a government a proprietary interest, the 
Court expressly rejected the notion that Regan’s equation of 
tax exemptions to subsidies controls the dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis.  Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 589 n.22. 
 Perhaps anticipating that we would find Camps 
Newfound more relevant than Regan, Appellees urge us to 
disregard Camps Newfound, asserting that it was abrogated in 
relevant part by Department of Revenue v. Davis.  Not so.  In 
Davis, a majority of the Supreme Court held that Kentucky’s 
scheme of offering tax exemptions on bonds issued by 
Kentucky but not on out-of-state bonds did not violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause, 553 U.S. at 356-57, and a 
plurality of the Court would have found the differential tax 
treatment for in-state bonds to be market participation, id. at 
343-48.  The plurality reached this conclusion, however, 
“only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer” “has entered 
the market for debt securities.”  Id. at 344.  That is, Kentucky 
was a market participant not because it provided tax 
exemptions, but instead because it sold the very bonds for 
which it gave differential tax treatment, and the differential 
tax treatment thus facilitated Kentucky’s own participation in 
the market.  See id. at 348 n.17.  Not so here, where Jersey 
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City is not selling or providing any goods or services with 
respect to Tax Abated Projects, nor acting as an investor, 
owner, or financier with respect to those projects. 
 We also reject Appellees’ rather tenuous argument that 
the City has a proprietary interest because the Tax Abated 
Projects will improve the City’s economy, which in turn will 
lead to future tax revenues.  Tax abatements designed to 
improve future revenue streams are not equivalent to the 
purchase or sale of goods or services and do not transform the 
City into an investor, owner, or financier of the Tax Abated 
Projects.  See Sage, 390 F.3d at 216 (holding that a “projected 
stream of increased tax revenue” is not a proprietary interest 
“because it is not comparable to the financial interest that an 
ordinary market participant has in a project”).  Likewise, the 
fact that the City marks areas for redevelopment and then 
approves the projects receiving a tax exemption to ensure that 
they comport with the City’s redevelopment plan, see N.J. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 40A:20-3, -8, 40A:21-4; see also Mun. Code 
§ 304-6, does not confer a proprietary interest.  In Sage, for 
example, where Pittsburgh’s redevelopment agency approved 
the construction of a hotel in an effort to redevelop a district 
in that city, we held that Pittsburgh had a proprietary interest 
in the project only because the city, through its redevelopment 
authority, provided bond financing to the hotel and not 
because it had a general interest in economic redevelopment.  
390 F.3d at 216-17.  In sum, important and laudable as the 
City’s interest is in redevelopment, that interest does not by 
itself confer upon the City status as a market participant. 
IV. 
 Our holding is as narrow as our inquiry.  We offer no 
comment on, much less do we decide, whether the challenged 
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Ordinance is in fact preempted by the NLRA or ERISA, or 
whether it runs afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.  We 
hold only that the District Court erred in concluding that the 
City acts as a market participant when it enforces the 
Ordinance with respect to Tax Abated Projects.  We therefore 
reverse and remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
